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The Constitutionality of Generic 
Advertising Checkoff Programs
John M. Crespi and Roger A. McEowen
JEL Classification: K10, Q18
Until recently, the legal status of generic advertising pro-
grams seemed questionable. After an initial victory for
generic advertising proponents in 1997 in Glickman v.
Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc. (521 U.S. 457 (1997)),
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled four years later in United
States v. United Foods, Inc. (533 U.S. 405 (2001)) that the
federally-mandated mushroom advertising program was
not part of a larger regulatory scheme (as was present in
the 1997 case), and was, therefore, unconstitutional as
compelled private speech. To many, the marketing of
mushrooms under the checkoff statute at the heart of the
United Foods case seemed no different from the way in
which other commodities promoted through checkoff
programs, like beef and pork, were marketed.  After the
United Foods case, it seemed only a matter of time before
all mandatory checkoff programs would be ruled uncon-
stitutional as well. 
The Supreme Court did not address in either the 1997
or 2001 cases, however, whether the checkoff-funded
generic advertising programs at issue were government
speech and, therefore, not subject to challenge as an
unconstitutional proscription of private speech under the
First Amendment. That question was answered in 2005
when the Court upheld the Constitutionality of the beef
checkoff on government speech grounds. The checkoff
industry was immediately re-invigorated.
What does this new ruling mean for other checkoff
programs? This article reviews recent commodity promo-
tion litigation, speculates on what opponents of compelled
support for generic advertising may be planning next, and
considers some potential fallout from the recent decision.
The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (7
U.S.C. § 601 et seq.) and several “stand-alone” acts (such as
the Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985, 7 U.S.C. §
2901 et seq.) establish the federal statutes for checkoff pro-
grams. These mandated, grower-funded programs are used
for a variety of industry enhancement programs including
research, market development, and marketing strategies.
The most controversial strategies surround the use of
industry funds for generic advertising. Since the 1980s,
the generic advertising portion of these checkoffs has been
challenged constitutionally on the basis that the mandated
programs violate the freedom of speech of producers.
Courts have long held that advertising is a form of private
speech protected under the First Amendment and that the
right to freedom of speech also includes the right not to
subsidize a private message with which an individual dis-
agrees (see, for example, Keller v. State Bar of California,
496 U.S. 1 (1990)). The programs may be challenged on
freedom of association grounds. Like the speech issue,
opponents of generic advertising claim that the mandatory
assessments compel industry participants to be associated
with a particular message (the advertising) with which
they do not agree. Over the last two decades, nearly every
commodity promotion program in the country has been
challenged.
After years of wrangling over the constitutionality of
mandated producer-funded generic advertising programs,
a case finally reached the U.S. Supreme Court. In 1997,
the Supreme Court ruled in Glickman that a federally
mandated checkoff program for California tree fruits was
constitutional. The main issue in the case concerned the
amount of regulation that already existed in the California
tree-fruit industry. Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens
repeatedly stressed the statutory context within which the
generic promotion program had arisen and that generic
campaigns had to be viewed in light of the regulatory
scheme that Congress had put forward:
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“California nectarines and
peaches are marketed pursu-
ant to detailed marketing
orders that have displaced
many aspects of independent
business activity that charac-
terize other portions of the
economy in which competi-
tion is fully protected by the
antitrust laws. The business
entities that are compelled to
fund the generic advertising
at issue in this litigation do
so as a part of a broader col-
lective enterprise in which
their freedom to act inde-
pendently is already con-
strained by the regulatory
scheme” (Glickman, at 457).
The Court then pointed out that
there were four characteristics of the
California nectarine and peach mar-
keting orders’ regulatory schemes
that distinguished the orders from
other laws that had been found to
violate the First Amendment. First,
the checkoff programs did not pre-
vent producers from communicating
any message to any audience. Sec-
ond, the programs did not compel
handlers to engage in any actual or
symbolic speech. Third, the pro-
grams did not compel the handlers to
endorse or to finance any political or
ideological views. Fourth, the pro-
grams had antitrust exemptions. The
Court stressed that the regulatory
nature of the marketing orders for
the industries in question required
that the generic advertising be judged
in a different light from that of other
commercial speech cases. Congress
had made a regulatory decision that,
right or wrong, certain commodities
should be marketed jointly. Justice
Stevens, writing for the majority,
stated:
“In sum, what we are review-
ing is a species of economic
regulation that should enjoy
the same strong presumption
of validity that we accord to
other policy judgments
made by Congress. The
mere fact that one or more
producers ‘do not wish to
foster’ generic advertising of
their product is not a suffi-
cient reason for overriding
the judgment of the majority
of the market participants,
bureaucrats, and legislators
who have concluded that
such programs are benefi-
cial” (Glickman, at 477).
To many, the issue of mandated
promotion seemed to have been
decided with the Glickman case.
However, in November of 1999, the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
that the Mushroom Promotion Act
of 1990 (7 U.S.C. § 6101 et seq.)
was unconstitutional because, unlike
the marketing orders in Glickman,
the Mushroom Act was not in the
same spirit as the broader, collective
regulation that the Supreme Court
used to uphold the tree-fruit order
(United Foods, Inc. v. USDA, 197
F.3d 221 (6th Cir. 1999)). United
Foods, Inc., a Tennessee food proces-
sor, had challenged the 1990 Mush-
room Act on the grounds that the
assessments were compelled commer-
cial speech and that the marketing of
mushrooms was distinct from the
marketing that existed in the Califor-
nia tree-fruit industry in the Glick-
man case. 
The attorneys for United Foods
used a very interesting argument to
distinguish the mushroom industry
from the tree-fruit industry. Focusing
on the language of Justice Stevens’
opinion concerning regulation and
compelled association, they empha-
sized that the regulatory environment
that justified the tree-fruit order was
almost completely absent in the
mushroom industry. The Court of
Appeals found this limited-regulation
argument persuasive. Writing for the
majority, Judge Merritt stated: “The
Court’s holding in Glickman, we
believe, is that nonideological, com-
pelled, commercial speech is justified
in the context of the extensive regula-
tion of an industry but not other-
wise” (United Foods, Inc. v. USDA,
197 F.3d 221 (6th Cir. 1999), at
224). In other words, without the
extensive regulation present in the
tree-fruit marketing orders, there was
no justification for any further limits
on compelled speech.
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld the Sixth Circuit’s rul-
ing in 2001. Writing for the majority,
Justice Kennedy pointed out the dif-
ferences between the 1997 tree-fruit
case and the mushroom case: “The
program sustained in [Glickman] dif-
fers from the one under review in a
most fundamental respect. In [Glick-
man] the mandated assessments for
speech were ancillary to a more com-
prehensive program restricting mar-
keting autonomy. Here, for all practi-
cal purposes, the advertising itself, far
from being ancillary, is the principal
object of the regulatory scheme” (US
v. United Foods, Inc. 533 U.S. 405
(2001), at 411-412). Thus, as long as
the generic advertising is part of a
broader regulatory scheme (like the
marketing orders for fruit), the
assessments pass constitutional mus-
ter. However, if generic advertising is
the primary purpose for collecting
the assessments, the assessments then
violated the First Amendment. It did
not take long for opponents of other
mandatory checkoff programs,
including the beef checkoff program,
to adopt the strategy that was suc-
cessful in the United Foods case. The
Beef Promotion and Research Act
(“Beef Act,” 7 U.S.C. § 2901 et seq.)
was passed by Congress as part of the
Food Security Act of 1985 (16
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U.S.C. §§ 3801-3862). Under the
Beef Act, the Secretary of Agriculture
is directed to issue a Beef Promotion
and Research Order and appoint a
Cattlemen’s Beef Promotion and
Research Board which imposes a $1
per head checkoff on all sales or
importation of cattle. This assess-
ment then is used to fund such things
as beef promotional activities, which
are designed by the Operating Com-
mittee of the Beef Board and
approved by the Secretary of Agricul-
ture.
Citing United Foods, the trial
court ruled in 2001 that the beef
checkoff program was unconstitu-
tional (Livestock Marketing Assoc.
(LMA) v. USDA, 132 F. Supp. 2d
817 (D. S.D. 2001)).1 In this case,
the government’s argument that the
beef checkoff was government speech
was rejected by the trial court. On
appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
affirmed (LMA. v. USDA, 335 F.3d
711 (8th Cir. 2003)). The U.S.
Supreme Court subsequently agreed
to hear the case. 
Meanwhile, another case against
the Beef Act was winding its way
through the federal courts. In
November 2002, the Federal District
Court for Montana held that the beef
program “creates programs where the
government utilizes private cattlemen
to disseminate a single message, a
message prescribed by Congress and
the USDA” (Charter v. USDA, 230 F.
Supp. 2d 1121 (D.Mont. 2002)). In
the Charter case, the District Court
held that the government is making
the speech through the cattlemen
rather than for the cattlemen and, as
such, the speech was government
speech, not individual or private,
commercial speech. Thus, the adver-
tising did not implicate the plaintiffs’
First Amendment rights. The Charter
case was appealed to the U.S. Court
of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit.
Before the Ninth Circuit ruled on
the Charter appeal, the Supreme
Court rendered its opinion in the
LMA beef case. In a 6-3 ruling, with
the majority opinion written by Jus-
tice Scalia, the Court upheld the beef
checkoff on the grounds that the pro-
gram was government speech
(Johanns, et al. v. LMA, 544 U.S. 550
(2005)).
Why the change? In the major-
ity’s opinion, the beef checkoff case
revolved around the question of
whether the statutory language of the
Beef Act created an advertising pro-
gram that could be classified as gov-
ernment speech. Thus, as Justice Sca-
lia explains, “We have not heretofore
considered the First Amendment
consequences of government-com-
pelled subsidy of the government’s
own speech.”
While the government speech
doctrine is fairly new and not well
developed, prior Supreme Court
opinions (not involving agricultural
commodity checkoffs) indicated that
to constitute government speech, a
government mandated program must
pass three tests. First, the government
must exercise sufficient control over
the source of the message to be
deemed ultimately responsible for the
message. Second, the main purpose
of the message and the program must
be identified as the government’s.
Finally, the source of the assessments
must come from a large, nondiscrete
group. It was believed by many that
the beef checkoff would have a hard
time overcoming this last test because
the source of the funding, cattle pro-
ducers, seemed to be a rather dis-
crete, identifiable group. The ratio-
nale behind this third test is that
courts have ruled that greater care
needs to be taken when the govern-
ment seeks to tax individuals or
groups to pay for messages. The
broader the source of the financing,
the more diluted is the governmental
infringement on individual rights. 
Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, opined that the first two
tests were satisfied because Congress
has provided the rationale for a com-
pelling state interest and instructed
the Secretary of Agriculture to both
impose the order, as well as oversee
the actions of the Beef Board and the
program’s Operating Committee.
While the opponents of the beef
advertising program had argued that
the Operating Committee was a non-
governmental entity and, thus, the
advertising cannot be considered
government speech, the Court
rejected this premise: “The message
of the promotional campaigns is
effectively controlled by the Federal
Government itself. The message set
out in the beef promotions is from
beginning to end the message estab-
lished by the Federal Government....
Congress and the Secretary have set
out the overarching message and
some of its elements, and they have
left the development of the remain-
ing details to an entity whose mem-
bers are answerable to the Secretary....
Moreover, the record demonstrates
that the Secretary exercises final
approval authority over every word
used in every promotional campaign”
(125 S.Ct. 2055 at 2063 (2005)). 
1. In October 2002, a U.S. district 
judge in Michigan, Richard Enslen, 
also citing United Foods, ruled that 
similar legislation for the pork 
checkoff program was not only 
unconstitutional but “rotten” as 
well (Michigan Pork Producers 
Association v. Campaign for Family 
Farms, 229 F. Supp. 2d 772 (W.D. 
Mich. 2002)) and struck down the 
entire pork checkoff, including the 
portions for research and education.
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As to the final test regarding the
source of the assessments, Justice Sca-
lia argued that the compelled assess-
ments, in fact, are unaffected by
whether the funds are raised through
general or targeted assessments. The
dissent argued that this final test was
key to the Act’s being unconstitu-
tional as the Act did not establish suf-
ficient democratic checks. With this
majority ruling, however, the Court
eliminated this last test entirely. As
Scalia opined, “Citizens may chal-
lenge compelled support of private
speech, but have no First Amend-
ment right not to fund government
speech. And that is no less true when
the funding is achieved through tar-
geted assessments devoted exclu-
sively to the program to which the
assessed citizens object.” 
One First Amendment issue that
was not addressed was the association
issue. Most beef checkoff advertise-
ments are credited to “America’s Beef
Producers,” which may give the
impression that the objecting cattle
producers endorse the message. The
majority examined only the language
of the Act and concluded that
because the statute does not require
this attribution, the Act is not invalid
on its face. However, the Court did
note that they could not determine
whether association rights were being
violated because the record before
them did not contain evidence that
the ads were being associated with
the plaintiffs. Such an argument was
not part of the beef challenge, but is
part of a pending challenge of the
similar pork checkoff. In the pork
case, the challenge is whether the
government can compel producers to
belong to a particular group. Previous
rulings by the Supreme Court have
held that Freedom of Association
includes the right not to associate.
As this question was not part of the
beef checkoff case, the Court never
ruled on it. So, a checkoff program
that is found to constitute govern-
ment speech could still be found
unconstitutional on freedom of asso-
ciation grounds.
An interesting question is
whether the majority opinion was, in
reality, a minority opinion as far as
the government speech argument
goes. Two of the six Justices who
formed the majority, Justice Gins-
burg and Justice Breyer, concurred
with the majority opinion as an
acceptable decision, though they dis-
agreed with the rationale. Justice
Ginsburg wrote separately that the
Act was constitutional, but did not
agree that the beef checkoff consti-
tuted government speech. Justice
Breyer joined the majority, but wrote
separately that the checkoff was an
acceptable form of government regu-
lation; hence the government speech
issue was not pertinent for its consti-
tutionality.
What are the implications of the
Supreme Court decision on the beef
checkoff program for commodity
checkoff programs in general? In one
sense, it could be argued that neither
Glickman nor United Foods are rele-
vant anymore in determining the
constitutionality of a checkoff pro-
gram. After the United Foods ruling,
supporters of generic advertising
tried to argue that their industries
were more like that of the California
tree-fruits, while their opponents
argued that the industries were more
like those of the mushroom industry.
Because of this new ruling on the
beef checkoff, deciding whether a
program is pertinent based upon the
degree of regulation in an industry
no longer seems important if the
advertising funded can be considered
government speech. However, the
fact that only four of the Justices
actually saw the checkoff programs as
government speech and that two of
these, Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice O’Connor, are no longer on
the Court, makes the relevance of the
earlier decisions a bit murky.
Another implication of the beef
case ruling is that, since checkoff
messages may be considered govern-
ment speech, much more regulatory
oversight by the Secretary of Agricul-
ture over all programs may be inevi-
table because failure to sufficiently
monitor the programs may lead to
lax oversight over promotional mes-
sages. Claims that a program is not
being run as a government program
would most likely blossom into fur-
ther legal battles as to whether a pro-
gram is in line with Congress’ intent
and whether or not the operating
committee is sending an approved
message. Generic advertising done by
a program operating without suffi-
cient oversight, therefore, may be
seen as infringing on some partici-
pants’ First Amendment rights.  
Finally, for those thinking that
the ruling will be limited to checkoff
programs, a 2006 opinion of the
United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit is worth watching.
In 2003, the Tennessee legislature
authorized sales of a specialty license
plate with a “Choose Life” logotype
with half of the profits going to a pri-
vate organization, New Life
Resources, Inc. At the same time, the
legislature denied authorizing a pro-
choice specialty license plate at the
request of Planned Parenthood of
Tennessee. Consequently, the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union of Tennes-
see sued, challenging the Act as
unconstitutional. The Trial Court
agreed but, based on the LMA beef
case, the Appellate Court reversed
(ACLU of Tennessee, et al. v. Bredesen,
441 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2006)). Cit-
ing the Supreme Court’s beef check-
off decision, the Appeals Court noted
that the “Choose Life” license plate
2nd Quarter 2006 • 21(2) CHOICES 65
was a government-crafted message
where the legislature, like the Secre-
tary of Agriculture in the checkoff
program, had retained the right to
approve the message even though the
design and message itself was devel-
oped by a private organization. The
Court also cited the beef case in
holding that dissemination of a gov-
ernment-crafted message by a private
organization did not require the
views expressed to be neutral. The
U.S. Supreme Court has declined to
hear the case. Clearly, the govern-
ment speech doctrine set in motion
by the Supreme Court’s recent beef
checkoff ruling may very well have
repercussions far beyond the scope of
agricultural enterprises. 
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